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INTRODUCTION
Inferencing is essential for effective communication for two reasons. Firstly,
the conventional meaning of lexis is not always a clear indicator of the intended
message of speakers/ writers (e.g. Grice 1975). Secondly, "discourse rarely pro-
vides us with a fully explicit description of a situation" (Eysenck 1990:224); there
fore, we usually have to fill in the missing information (see also Clark & Clark
1977:96-98). It seems wise then for foreign language teachers and materials writ-
ers to take account of the clues and procedures involved in language interpreta-
tion.
But how is inferencing achieved? That is, how do we understand more than
(or even something different from) what the actual words seem to denote? What
knowledge and clues do we use? What processes  take place in our minds? As far
30
as ELT is concerned, what are the implications for decision-making, materials-
writing and classroom practice? In other words, what is it that teachers and mate-
rials writers need to know about inferencing, and how can they translate this
knowledge into teaching materials and procedures?
In Part 1 I discuss the clues provided by speakers/ writers, as well as the s
clues and thinking processes used by listeners/ readers in order for successful in-
ferencing to take place. This outline will draw on Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis ,
and Psycholinguistics. I will also provide examples of (in)effective communica-
tion, and will discuss the use of specific clues and procedures. In Part 2,1 briefly ,
discuss the implications for the learning/ teaching of English as a foreign lang-
uage.
PAR T1. BACKGROUND
Context. It is a truism worth restating that language is not used in a vacuum,.
but in specific situations, by people who want to achieve specific purposes. The
physical, social and psychological background in which language is used has been;
termed 'context' (see Brown & Yule 1983:36-46; Crystal 1991:79; Halliday &',
Hasan 1989:5-9; Levinson 1983:23). The basic elements of context are:
• Participants: speaker(s)/ writer(s) and (actual or intended) listener(s)/
reader(s).
•     Relationship between participants.
•      Topic
•       Setting (place & time).
• Purpose (what speakers/writers want to achieve).
Language out of context has only potential for meaning. In other words, the
same sentence/ utterance can have different meanings in different contexts. For
example, let us examine the meaning of question (1), asked in two different con-
texts:
(1) What do you think?'
• Context A. Two friends shopping. One of them tries on a pair of shoes,
looks at the other and asks: ' What do you think?' (= Do you think they suit me? /
Should I buy them?)
• Context B. Wife comes into the house all wet. Husband asks: 'Is it rain-
ing?'. Wife answers ' What do you think?' (= Of course it is!)
An interesting observation is that whereas in context A the speaker is asking
a genuine question, in context B the speaker doesn't expect a response.
A useful distinction has been made between context (as defined above) and
co-text, that is the text preceding and following the stretch of language we aim to
interpret (Brown & Yule 1983:46-50. See also TEXTUAL COHESION and NEW &
GIVEN INFORMATION IN DISCOURSE below)..
In order to further clarify the nature and use of contextual knowledge, I
would like to stress the following points.
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• Contextual knowledge is not an either/ or affair, but depends on the
number of contextual elements that a listener/ reader knows.
• In cases when listeners/ readers have partial knowledge of the context
they can use the given elements of the context, as well as the co-text and relevant
background knowledge to infer the missing contextual elements.
• Full knowledge of the context is not always essential for successful in-
terpretation (see Levinson 1983:22-23). Brown & Yule (1983:59) present the
"principle of local interpretation", which "instructs the hearer not to construct a
context any larger than he needs to arrive at an interpretation".
• When listeners/ readers try to interpret language out of context they use
"a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which [the particular
stretch of language] could be appropriately uttered" (Searle 1979 in Levinson
1983:8).
Background knowledge. Apart from knowledge of language and context,
listeners/ readers need to make use of background knowledge relevant to the con-
text in order to interpret the messages of speakers/ writers. For example, let us
take the following exchange:
(2) A.: What time is it?
B: Well, the postman's been already.
(From Brown & Yule 1983:226)
In order for A to make use of B's reply, A doesn't just need to understand the
language, but also to know what time the postman usually comes.
A number of models have been proposed regarding the way knowledge is
represented in the mind and used in interpretation. What seems to be common to
the different models is that we keep stored in our minds stereotyped representations
of places, situations, event sequences, participants etc. (Brown & Yule
1983:238-255; Clark & Clark 1977:166-168; Eysenck 1990:261-273; Singer
1990:98-110). For example, when the topic is 'going to the dentist' the knowledge
we will activate may include any of the following:
• Place & organisation (e.g. waiting room and surgery - which we expect
to be next/near to each other).
      • Objects, their position and layout (e.g. chairs and magazines in the waiting
room; dentist's equipment in the surgery), as well as their expected size,
weight, texture, colour etc.
•     Participants (e.g. dentist, secretary, nurse, other patients) and their roles.
       • Activities (e.g. drilling, filling a tooth), their sequence and their results.
       •     Sounds (e.g. drilling).
       •     Smells (e.g. camphor)
•     Feelings (e.g. anxiety).
These representations are modified and expanded according to our experi-
ence. When interpreting language, the nature and quantity of knowledge that is ac-
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tivated will depend on the particular context, co-text and our needs. Let us con-
sider example (3) below in a 'dentist' context:
(3) / tried to read to keep my mind occupied, but the sound kept reminding me
of what was to follow.
It is clear that we don't need to activate all possible elements of knowledge
for successful interpretation of (3).
Textual cohesion: Definition & Typology. We can define cohesion as the
'glue' which links the elements of a text (Crystal 1991:61; Richards et. al.
1992:62). Speakers/ writers can help listeners/ readers interpret texts by:
• Referring to something outside the text (exophoric co-reference); e.g.
''Not this one, the other one'.
• Referring to something in the text (endophoric co-reference). This can be
reference to what has already been mentioned (anaphoric co-reference), or ref-
erence to something that follows (cataphoric co-reference).
• Signalling the relation between parts of the text (e.g. addition, compari-
son, contrast, cause, result).
•     Making explicit the sequence of events (e.g. enumeration, use of tenses).
(Brown & Yule 1983; Halliday & Hasan 1976.)
Please note that the lexis creating cohesion are not necessarily found in adja -
cent sentences; cohesion can still exist when the cohesive devices are further
apart. The tables below provide an outline of the different ways in which speakers/
writers can create cohesion (sources of categories: Brown & Yule 1983:191-194;
Halliday & Hasan 1976; Malkmjaer 1991:463-464; Nunan 1993:21-32; Salkie
1995).
Repetition
•   'Crunchy Crisps. The crunchiest crisps you've ever tasted.'
•    'The more you know about whiskey, the more you appreciate Brand X.'
Lexical Relations
Synonymy & Antonymy
• '/ came home feeling exhausted. ... There was a message on. the answer-
ing machine about a party, but 1 was so knackered I just ignored it.'
• 'The teacher's enthusiasm can make even the most indifferent learner
show interest in the lesson.'
The second example shows that cohesion through synonymy/ antonymy can
also be created when the two words are not the same part of speech.
Hyperonymv & Hvponvmv
• 'Although he likes milk, he won't touch other dairy products'.
Here 'milk' (the hyponym) is a type of'dairyproduct' (the hyperonym)
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• 'They've also got a Labrador. He's adorable, but the little devil has
chewed every shoe in the house.'
This is an example of what Halliday & Hasan (1977: 274-277) term "general
noun" (here devil, modified by little).
Co-Reference
Exophoric
• As for Bill, 1 don't think we should wait any longer. 
Endophoric
• 'Mr Peterson was here yesterday evening. He seemed to be fine.' (Pro-
nouns)
• 'True, Ed's got a fast car, but mine is more reliable.' (Possessive adjec-
tives)
• 'I'll try to reason with him first. If that fails, I'll take him to court..''
(Deixis)
Substitution
•    '/ don't need a new computer. The one I 've got works fine.'
•    '/ am a social smoker, and so is my husband.'
Ellipsis
•      ' Your second assignment is much better than the first - - -.
The word 'assignment' is not repeated.
Connectives
Addition
• The room was small and cramped with furniture. '
Amplification
• Not only was the air-conditioning out of order, but the window was also
stuck.
Corroboration
• It does rain here a lot. As a matter of fact it's raining right now.
Contrast
•' Although her leg hurt, she managed to walk home.
Contradiction
• A: So you're a professor now? - B: Actually, I'm an assistant professor.
Cause / Effect
• Because of the strong wind the flight was delayed for two hours. 
Inference
•   A: / think the wine has got to my head. - B: So, no more wine for you?
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Continuation after a brief digression
• They had one of those mynah birds -1 think aunt Esther used to have one
- anyway what was strange about this bird.... 
Change of topic
• So you can't come tonight. Pity. Anyway, have you heard about Amanda? 
Summing up
• So, in a nutshell, the trip was a disaster. 
Clarification
• / mean, what's the point of trying to help him if he won't appreciate it?
• Just increasing traffic fines is papering over the cracks. In other words, it
won't work in the long run.
• You need to cut down on carbohydrates, that is pasta, rice etc.
Enumeration
• Now, first of all you should decide how much you 're willing to spend,
Hypothesis
• But what if the bank was closed?
Sequence
•   He checked that all windows were shut and then left the office.
Caveats. Halliday & Hasan (1977:4) argue that cohesive relations as outlined
above define a stretch of language as a text; in other words such relations help
readers/ listeners decide whether "a passage of language which is more than one
sentence in length ... forms a unified whole or is just a collection of unrelated sen-
tences" (op.cit.: 1). Brown & Yule (1983:199-204) express a number of caveats
regarding this view of cohesion. The ones which are directly relevant to our dis-
cussion follow.
The presence of cohesive ties does not ensure that a sequence of sentences
should be treated as a text. Although quite a lot of cohesive devices are used in (4)
below, the result is not a unified text.
(4) Cooking is seen by some as an art. Some artists become famous after
their death. Life after death is a belief shared by most religions. Religious con-
flicts sometimes result in war.
Availability of cohesive devices alone does not ensure successful interpreta-
tion. In (5) below, the reader needs to have the necessary context and background
knowledge in order to understand the function of and information in the text.
(5) From the beginning Trans Am struck a truce between Progressive, Shel-
lac-like rock and low-cost avant electronica. No two Trans Am records are alike -
on the earlier The Surveillance, traces of electronica were masked by a full-blown
homage to garage rock, while Futureworld contains just a one guitar-driven
track.
(From TheWire, Issue 182, April 1999).
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New & given information in discourse. Speakers/writers usually use lin-
guistic devices to mark entities (people, objects, ideas, information etc.) as 'new'
or 'given'. In the narrow sense, 'new' entities are the ones which are mentioned for
the first time, or are mentioned again after a long stretch of text; 'given' are
those the speaker/ writer has already mentioned. 'New' entities are introduced by
naming or by the indefinite article; for 'given' entities the definite article or a pro-
nominal reference is used (see Brown & Yule 1983:169-179). Consider (6) and (7)
below:
(6) It is a battle about how far countries are willing to accept constraints on
domestic policy ... The battle is putting huge strains on the World
Trade Organisation. 
(From The Economist, 8.5.1999)
(7) Music companies may soon be able to stop worrying about piracy on the
Internet. Instead, they will need to start worrying about what they are for.
(From The Economist, 8.5.1999)
In reality, what speakers/ writers treat as 'new' or 'given' is influenced by
what they expect their listeners/ readers will have in mind when interpreting a par-
ticular stretch of text (see Brown & Yule 1983:169-189; Clark & Clark 1977:91-
93). Example (8) below illustrates the point:
(8) Ted bought an expensive computer system, but only after a week the
screen broke down.
Here the treatment of 'the screen' as a given entity is based on the assump-
tion that the previous mention of a 'computer system' has lead listeners/ readers to
think of all the components of such a system, and therefore 'screen' was on their
minds when listening to or reading the second part of the text.
Communication conventions & implicature. The notion of implicature was
introduced by Grice (1975) to account for the distinction between what is said and
what is implicated by a speaker, or in other words "what the speaker can imply,
suggest, or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says" (Brown & Yule
1983:31). Leech (1983:17 & 30-35) uses the terms "sense" ("meaning as semanti-
cally determined") and "force" ("meaning as pragmatically, as well as semanti-
cally, determined"). He stated that "the force will be represented as a set of impli-
catures".
Grice's point of departure, and the cornerstone of his proposal, is that human
interaction has a set of purposes, or a "direction" mutually recognised and ac-
cepted by both interlocutors (Grice 1975:45-48). He summarised those shared
conventions in the Co-operative Principle and its Conversational Maxims (see
Table 1). Grice presents his framework more as a proposal to build upon than a
fully worked out theory, and leaves several issues open to further discussion. For
instance, he recognises the possibility of the need for more maxims (tentatively
proposing a fifth: "be polite"). Leech (1983) introduces a set of further principles,
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each with its own maxims. He particularly highlights the Politeness Principle as a
"necessary complement" of the co-operative principle (op.cit: 80) (see Table 2).
CO-OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE (Grice, 1975)
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you engaged.
Maxim of Quantity
Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not make your
con- tribution more informative than is required.
Maxim of Quality -





Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity). Be orderly.
Table 1.







Minimise cost to 
Minimise benefit to self other
Minimise dispraise of other
Minimise praise of self
Minimise disagreement
Minimise antipathy
Maximise benefit to other
Maximise cost to self
Maximise dispraise of self
Maximise dispraise of self
Maximise agreement
Maximise sympathy
THE IRONY PRINCIPLE (Leech 1983)
If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way that doesn't overtly conflict
with the Politeness Principle, but allows the bearer to arrive at the offensive point
of your remark indirectly, by way of implicature.
Table 2.
What seems to have been excluded from the discussion of implicature is the
manipulation of pauses and phonological features in spoken language, as well as
punctuation and letter-type in written language. It can be argued that manipulation
of such features aiming at leading listeners/ readers to work out implicatures is
compatible with Grice's proposals, as these features can be used by speakers/
writers to flout the Maxim of Manner. Let us take (9) as an example:
(9) As a reward Baldrick, take a short holiday.   ... (2" pause) … Did you
enjoy it?
(From the BBC video Black Adder the Third, BBCV 5713, 1995) 
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The pause before the question helps the listener to identify the duration of the
pause as the duration of the 'short holiday'.
Maxims & culture. A debatable aspect of the Principles and Maxims de-
scribed above is their universality. Grice (1975) seems to imply that they are cul-
ture-independent, since he makes no mention of culture-specific maxims or ways
of working out implicatures. Similarly, Levinson (1983:120-121) argues for the
universality of conversational implicatures on the grounds that "if the maxims are
derivable from considerations of rational co-operation, we would expect them to
be universal in application, at least in co-operative kinds of interaction".
Conversely, Keenan (1976) argues that "in developing such notions, philoso-
phers likely reflect on conversational conduct as it operates in their own society".
Keenan, after investigating the communication conventions in Malagasy (the lan-
guage of Madagascar) discovered the following.
• Speakers are not expected to observe the Quantity Maxim and regularly
provide less information than is required even if they have the information the lis-
tener needs. This is because in a closed community "new information is a rare
commodity" and the ones who have new information "are reluctant to reveal it",
as having access to information that others don't have gives them "some prestige"
over the others (op.cit. 70). Keenan (1976:76-77) notes that the Quantity Maxim is
more likely to be disregarded when the information is significant, the interlocutors
are not familiar with each other, or the speaker is a man. This leads to the interest-
ing observation that in Malagasy society "the same utterance may have different
conversational implicatures, depending on whether the speaker is a man or a
woman ... for a woman may be expected to answer the question fully if they have
the information desired" (op.cit.: 78).
• Use of an indefinite expression to refer to an individual (e.g. I see a per-
son) does not lead listeners to infer that the person is not familiar to the speaker.
This is because in Malagasy society it is considered bad luck to refer to someone
using their personal name, and prefer to use a nickname, the person's occupation,
sex or age, or even refer to someone as 'person' (Keenan 1976:72-74).
Furthermore, Gumperz (1982) and Jupp et al. (1982) discuss cases of inter-
cultural miscommunication, several instances of which are attributed to "misread-
ings of intent" between interlocutors. Let us examine the following examples.
• A house painter (American) is visiting the house he is assigned to paint,
looks at some paintings on the wall and asks the owner (British) "Who's the art-
ist?" The owner answers "The painter is not well known. He's a modern London
painter named X." The painter hesitates and says "/ was wondering if someone in
family was an artist." The source of the misunderstanding here is the lack of
knowledge on the part of the owner of the fact that the question was meant to be
complimentary of someone in the household- in the same way that a guest, by no-
ticing a musical instrument in the house, may ask "Who's the musician?".
(Source: Gumperz 1982:144-145)
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• A South Asian applicant is being interviewed by a British interviewer
both are male). Towards the end of the interview the interviewer asked "Why are
you applying for this particular job?" The applicant failed to understand that the
question was meant to elicit the aspects of the job that the applicant found appeal-
ing and/or relevant to his career. Instead he understood the question as meaning
"Why do you want a job?" and responded accordingly. This was also the interpre-
tation of a number of other South Asians asked by the researchers. (Source: Jupp
etal. 1982:252)
In both cases above, the misreadings seem to stem from the interlocutors fail-
ing to detect the culture specific clues which were meant to lead them to recognise
the existence of the underlying implicature. Another reason for the misreadings
may be mat utterances that carry conventional implicatures in one culture may be
taken at face value by speakers from another culture, and vice versa. Furthermore,
Coulthard (1985:53) notices that "one complicating problem for foreigners is that
speech communities differ in the relative weight they give to positive and negative
politeness and the amount of politeness they require in informal situations."
Types of implicature, Implicatures can be categorised in two ways, accord-
ing to whether they depend on (a) the Co-operative Principle and its Maxims, and
(b) a particular context.
a) Regarding the Co-operative Principle & Maxims.
• Conventional: They are not derived from the Co-operative Principle and
its Maxims, but are "attached by convention to particular lexical items or expres-
sions" (Levinson 1983:127). Leech (1983:26) gives the example of good luck and
bad luck. Although their structure is similar (good/ bad + luck) their straightfor-
ward meaning/ use is distinctly different: 'good luck' is a wish, whereas 'bad
luck' expresses sympathy.
• Non-conventional: They are not part of the conventional meaning of lin-
guistic expressions. Listeners/ readers need to use available clues to work out the
non-conventional implicatures of speakers/writers (Grice 1975:50; Levinson
1983:117).
b) Regarding Context.
• Generalised: They don't depend on a particular context for their interpretation.
For example, 'Iwalked into a house' will be understood to implicate that
the house was not mine (Levinson 1983:1:26).
• Particularised: They can only be worked out with knowledge of context.
For examples see IMPLICATURE & INFERENCE AT PLAY below.
Maxims & speaker/writer options. As regards the maxim outlined above,
speakers have the following alternatives (Grice 1975:49; Levinson, 1983:104 &
109):
•     They can observe a maxim (i.e. adhere to it). 
           • They can violate a maxim (i.e. secretly not adhere to it).
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• They can opt out (i.e. make it clear that they are unwilling to adhere to
it)
• They may be faced with a clash (i.e. be unable to fulfil one maxim with-
iout violating another).
• They can flout (or exploit) a maxim (i.e. clearly and purposefully fail to
fulfil a maxim).
The last option presents the greatest interest for our discussion, as it is the
one which speakers/writers exercise to communicate meanings beyond the con-
ventional meaning of the words they use. The following two examples show
Grice's maxims 'in action'.
(10) (Context: A and B are strangers. B is waiting outside a shop; a dog is sit-
ting beside him. B is aware of the presence of the dog. A is on his way into the
shop.)
A: Does your dog bite?
B: No.
(Speaker A reaches down to pat the dog. The dog bites his hand).
A: Ouch! Hey! You said your dog doesn't bite.
B: He doesn't. But that's not my dog.
(Adapted from Yule 1996:36)
In (10) we have a clear instance of lack of co-operation. Although B did tell
the truth (his dog doesn't bite) he did not give the information that A actually
asked for (i.e. if the dog beside B bites). B chose to ignore the relevance of 'here'
and 'now' (i.e. understand that in the particular context A was seeking information
about the dog present, which he mistook for B's dog). To use Grice's terms,
speaker B observes the Quality maxim, but violates the maxims of Quantity and
Relation; for example, B could have added '... but this is not my dog', or could
have answered 'It's not my dog'. Of course, speaker A could have been more ex-
plicit and not expect that B would interpret 'your dog' as 'the dog sitting beside
you'. We can assume that A's choice was based upon the assumption that B
shared the same culture / communication conventions.
Let us compare the two versions in (11) below:
(11a) Open the door.
(11b) Walk up to the door, turn the door handle clockwise as far as it will go, 
and then pull gently towards you.
(From Levinson 1983:108)
The main difference between (11a) and (11b) is that the second text gives
much more detailed information. It is impossible to answer the question without
information about the context. For example, text (a) would be effective as a com-
mand from an officer to a soldier, or a straightforward request from one friend to
another. In those contexts, a speaker using version (b) could well be understood as
expressing irony or implying that the listener is rather dim, as he/ she violates the
maxim of quantity by giving more information than needed. On the other hand, (b)
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would be preferable in the context of an expert giving information on how to open
a door which is connected to a explosive device. In the second context, response
(a) would be less than informative (not to mention lethal).
Implicature & inference at play. In this section I will examine examples of 
the clues and thought processes employed by listeners/ readers in order to infer
successfully, as well as examples of how speakers/ writers create style and effect.
In my discussion I will be referring to the responses and comments of participants
in the lectures and talks2. Readers are invited to recreate the interactive conditions
of those sessions by reading the examples and responding to the prompts & ques-
tions before reading the commentary.
(12) A: Where's Bill?
B: There's a yellow VW outside Sue's house.
(From Levinson 1983:112)
Does B seem to be co-operative?
What is B's intended message?
How can A understand B's message?
Of course, B could be much more helpful and answer 7 think he is at Sue's,
because his car is parked outside her house'. Still, such a straightforward answer
is only one option. B prefers to give A some relevant facts and let him/ her draw
conclusions. What is more, in some contexts it might be safer for B to let A draw
his/her own conclusions. Let us follow A's (probable) train of thought:
/ haven't received a straightforward answer, but still believe that B does
want to answer my question. Let me see how I can use the clues that B gave me: I 
know that Bill owns a yellow VW and that he's a friend of Sue's. So I think that B 
wants to tell me that as far as he/she knows Bill is at Sue's.
The clues used here are:
• Shared knowledge/experience.
• Belief that the speaker wants to be helpful..
• Belief that the speaker has information that (as far as he/ she knows) is
correct.
(13a)Where's the cheese sandwich?
What does the speaker want to know?
What response do you expect?
Look at the answer (13b).
(13b)He's sitting over there by the window. 
(Adapted from Yule 1996:20).
Is this a relevant/helpful answer?
How did the participants manage to understand each other?
This is an exchange between two waiters. Referring to customers by their or-
der is quite common in such contexts. What is more, we expect that the first waiter
asked the question in order to serve the right customer. The clues used here are:
•     Shared knowledge/conventions
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        • Knowledge of context
      It should be mentioned here that lack of knowledge of the 'restaurant' context
would make it difficult for a reader/ listener of this exchange to understand that
the 'cheese sandwich' is actually a customer.
(14) Johnny: Hey Sa//y, let's play marbles.
Mother: /tow is your homework getting along, Johnny?
(From Levinson 1983:1 12.)
What does Johnny's mother want? 
How do we understand that?
The participants understood the mother's response (as indeed would Johnny)
as a command for Johnny to finish his homework before doing anything else. Al-
though the response is grammatically a question, it doesn't function as one. That
is, the mother does not require a report on the progress of Johnny's homework, as
it is clear that Johnny is not working on it right now. The clues used here are:
•  Context (mother-child relationship)
•    Co-text: Johnny's stated intention to play marbles.
•    Knowledge of the conventions/ rules applying in that context (play is al-
lowed only after schoolwork or house chores have been completed).
(15) Patience walked into a room. The chandeliers burned brightly. 
(From Clark & Clark 1977:97-98.)
Where were the chandeliers? 
Most participants 'saw' the chandeliers in the room Patience walked into.
What is interesting is that no explicit connector is there to signal this. Participants
were able to infer the location of the chandeliers combining the following clues:
• Proximity: the two sentences are one after the other, therefore readers
expect a link.
• Time/space sequence: like a camera we follow Patience into the room
and with her see the chandeliers.
• The definite article ( 'the chandeliers '): the writers treats the chandeliers
as 'given' . But what has already been introduced is the room; therefore readers are
led to infer that there is a close link between 'room' and 'chandeliers'.
• Shared knowledge/ experience: chandeliers in a room are consistent with
our experience. Readers would find it more difficult or even impossible to draw
this inference if the second sentence were 'The crocodiles looked hungry', as this
would contradict expectations of what a room may normally contain.
(16) Mary got the picnic supplies out of the car. The beer was warm.
(From Clark & Clark 1977:97-98.)
Where was the beer?
Where were the picnic supplies?
What did the picnic supplies include? 
'
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All participants understood that the beer was part of the picnic supplies. It is
interesting that some participants did not even feel there was anything to infer, as
the text seemed straightforward and explicit to them. This is an indication that in
familiar contexts inference procedures are quick. Participants also 'saw' that the
picnic supplies were in a picnic basket, which was in the boot of the car, and that
the supplies also included sandwiches, soft drinks, fruit and dessert. It should be
mentioned here that readers who are not familiar with the activity of picnicking
would be expected to find the connection between 'beer' and 'picnic supplies'
much less straightforward, even if they had the meaning of 'picnic' explained to
them.
The clues used here are:
•     Proximity.
•     The definite article.
• Shared knowledge/ experience. 
(17) A: Look at me! I'm fat and ugly.
B: Come on, you're not fat!
(From Gabrielatos 1995:15.)
• What is the second speaker's intended message?
• How is it expressed?
Superficially, A seems to be making a statement. Nevertheless, the fact that
A says that in the presence of B leads B to infer that he/ she is invited to make a
comment. Similarly, although B does not make a negative comment explicitly, A
clearly receives the message that B thinks (or wants A to think) that A is ugly.
Here the source of the insult (or joke) is the omission of 'and ugly' in B's re-
sponse. To return to A's prompt, what makes its function clear is that B cannot
avoid commenting on A's statement; even silence would be understood as an in-
sult/joke. This case illustrates how the Irony Principle (Leech 1983) can be put to
use (for a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of humour see Nash 1985). It is in-
teresting to notice that participants did not question for a moment the function of
A's 'statement' as a prompt. The clues used here are:
• Context: A's comment is made in the presence of B.
• Quantity Maxim and/or Irony Principle: B's response addresses only part
of A's prompt.
(18) "That young girl [the android] added unexpectedly is one of the least
benightedly unintelligent organic life forms it has been my profound lack of pleasure
not to be able to avoid meeting. "
(From Life the Universe and Everything, Douglas Adams, Pan Books,
1982:138.)
How is style/ effect created in (18)?
Here the reader's attention is drawn by the flouting of the maxims of Quan-
tity (wordiness of expression) and Manner (series of negatives). It is exactly be-
cause readers would need to make extra effort to untangle the web of negatives
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that this excerpt is effective. Expressing the content of the text in a concise and
straightforward way (e.g. 'That young girl is one of the most intelligent organic
life forms I have had the misfortune to meet') would diminish the effect on the
reader.
A similar effect is produced by the wordiness and series of interlocking parenthetical
comments/ explanations in (19) below.
(19) "You are a driver," he said, "and I use the word in the loosest possible sense, i.e. 
meaning merely somebody who occupies the driving seat of what I will for the moment
call - but I use the term strictly without prejudice - a car while it is proceeding along
the road, of stupendous, I would even say verging on the superhuman, lack of skill."
(From The Long Dark Tea-time of the Soul, Douglas Adams, Pan Books,
1988:120.)
Summarising comments: Decoding vs. interpretation. Understanding the
conventional meaning of lexical and grammatical structures is only the first step
towards successful interpretation of linguistic messages.
Following, breaking & bending the rules. Grice presented the Co-operative
Principle and its Maxims as "guidelines for the efficient and effective use of lan-
guage in conversation to further co-operative ends" (Levinson 1983:301). But fol-
lowing these guidelines (or 'rules') is only one option. Table 3 below outlines the
options speakers/ writers have, as well as the potential consequences for verbal
expression and communication.
OBEYING THE RULES
(Observing maxims or opting 
out)
Communication    is    explicit &
straightforward.
Expression can lack flavour/ interest.





Communication of untruths. 
BENDING THE RULES
(Flouting maxims)
Flexibility of expression. 
Creation of interest/ style/ effect.
Humour.
Any     offence/friction     is      indi-
rect/milder.
Table 3. Summary of interaction options and their effects.
Inference & reference. For successful inference, listeners/ readers need to
iitcurately identify the entities to which speakers/ writers refer (within or outside me
text).
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Context creation. When listeners/ readers have partial knowledge of context
they can use textual information, the elements of context they know, and relevant
background knowledge to infer the missing contextual elements.
Inferencing procedures. We can see inferencing as a combination of identi-
fying available helpful clues and filtering them through knowledge of a number of












F I L T E R E D T H R O U G H
KNOWLEDGE OF CONTEXT
+
KNOWLEDGE /  EXPERIENCE / EXPECTATIONS / BELIEFS
+
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNICATION CONVENTIONS
I N F E R E N C E
Table 4. Inference: clues and procedures.
PART2. IMPLICATIONS FOR ELT
ELT materials & cultural content. Since different cultures may have dif-
ferent communication conventions it would be wise to help learners become aware
of the conventions governing the use of the target language. Failure to do so will
lead learners to assume that the conventions of their native language/ culture apply
when using the target language. Since English is used as a first language by a vari-
ety of cultures, teachers and materials writers need to address the problem of se-
lecting which variety of English they are going to teach (e.g. British, American,
Australian). What is more, learners need to become aware of the fact that some of
the conventions governing the variety they are learning may not (fully) apply to
other English speaking cultures.
Awareness can be achieved by using either authentic texts, or specially con-
structed texts which successfully simulate authentic use. Of course texts alone
cannot raise learners' awareness; teachers need to guide learners to discover rele-
vant cultural aspects of communication, as well as provide support in the form of
explanations and further input.
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Grammar. It would be wise to combine the manipulation of grammatical
structures (e.g. transformations) with awareness-raising regarding the potential
implicatures (particularly conventional ones) that may arise from different surface
structures (Leech 1983:22; Levinson 1983:125). In Leech's terms, learners should
be taught not only the 'sense' but also the potential 'force' of a structure. Present-
ing language through texts (as opposed to 'model' sentences in isolation) will fa-
cilitate that objective.
Requiring learners to produce full, over-explicit or uniform answers at all
times (e.g. for the sake of practising a certain structure) can also prove problem-
atic. Uniform answers may create the impression that there is only one cor-
rect/acceptable way of expressing an intended meaning. Use of over-explicit lan-
guage by learners may lead native listeners/ readers to understand unintended im-
plicatures. Similarly, if learners expect over-explicit messages, they may be con-
fused and discouraged by the elliptical nature of every day language. (See also
'LISTENING & READING' below).
Lexis. Although teaching vocabulary through lexical relations (synonymy,
antonymy, hyponymy) can be a very effective technique, teachers need to help
learners become aware of the differences as well as the similarities within lexical
sets. Particularly regarding antonymy, learners need to understand that negating
the opposite of a word does not always give the original meaning (e.g. 'not bad'
does not communicate the same meaning as 'good').
Therefore, it seems that apart from the meaning of lexical items learners need
to be taught their use, so that they don't lead listeners/readers to draw unintended
conventional implicatures. Magee & Rundell (1996) provide interesting data for
the expression 'not exactly'. Their analysis of the British National Corpus revealed
that native speakers use this expression hi an ironic way 60% of the time, whereas
analysis of the Longman Learners' Corpus showed that learners used this expres-
sion ironically in only 12% of the instances. Also learners used the expression far
less frequently than native speakers.
Awareness of register and genre is also important, as use of words/ expres-
sions which are too formal or too informal for the particular context can lead lis-
teners/ readers to misread the learner's message or intentions. For example, the
use of formal language in an informal context may be perceived by listeners/ read-
ers as intended to create social distance, or to convey humour/irony.
Listening & reading. Learners are aware of their linguistic shortcomings, and,
consequently, lack confidence. As a result, they tend to pay more attention to
the propositional level of the utterance. More simply, they are preoccupied with
understanding the meaning of individual words. Therefore, learners may fail to
work out intended implicatures, and, as a result, fail to understand the intended
meaning of the speaker/ writer. Since communication depends on more than the
meaning of lexis  and  grammatical  structures,  reading  and listening lessons should
help learners move beyond merely understanding isolated lexis/ structures (see
also Gabrielatos 1998:52).
The main goal of learners is to be able to understand texts targeted at native
speakers. But speakers/ writers, having a native-speaker audience in mind, will as-
sume certain shared knowledge/ assumptions with their listeners/readers, which
learners may not have. Learners may be helped by the following:
• Knowledge of the learners' language/ culture on the part of the teacher
will lead to informed decisions regarding the support learners need in order to
work out implicatures successfully. Of course, teachers themselves should also be
aware of cultural elements relevant to the target language.
• If the learners' level permits, authentic texts should be used. When spe-
cially constructed texts are deemed necessary, care should be taken so that they
are not unnaturally explicit (i.e. containing only straightforward propositions).
• Questions in receptive skills lessons should not focus solely on facts/
ideas that have been explicitly expressed or conventionally implicated. Students
need to be guided to identify and work out the speaker's/ writer's non-
conventional implicatures.
• Effective listening skills development needs to incorporate awareness-
raising on how stress, intonation and tone of voice can provide clues for the
speaker's intended implicatures.
Lexical inference. In language learning, one very useful application of infer-
encing is understanding the meaning of unknown lexis in a text. This is an indis-
pensable enabling skill as it not only increases the effectiveness of learners' recep-
tive skills, but also helps learners develop their lexical competence independently
(see also Gabrielatos 1995; Nuttall 1996:62-76).
Using text (20) below I will exemplify the clues and thought processes that
can be used in order for learners to infer the meaning of 'cyanide' (adapted from
Gabrielatos 1994).
(20)
Woman freed after retrial 
on friend’s death
A WOMAN who left cyanide in
her kitchen cupboard which killed a
party guest who thought it was sugar
was freed yesterday after admitting
manslaughter.
Tricia O’Mahoney was jailed for
life for murder in March 1991, but the 
Court of Appeal ordered a retrial after
new evidence came to light.
   Yesterday she was jailed for four
it can be found in a kitchen
it can kill
it looks like sugar
Learners need to use the cohesive 
ties indicated by ‘who’, ‘her’, ‘which’,
‘who’ and ‘it’.
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years at the Old Bailey - the time she
had spent in custody - after Judge Neil
Denison decided she had suffered
enough.
Mrs O’Mahoney, aged 41,
pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the
grounds that she was “grossly negli-
gent” by leaving the poison in her lar-
der among food. Her plea of not guilty
to murder was accepted by the court.
Glyn Cooper, aged 51, died at
Mrs O’Mahoney’s house in Streat-
ham, south London, during a party
while she was making him a cup of
coffee. He picked up a jar of rat poi-
son thinking it was sugar, said Rock
Tansey QC, defending.
“She had no motive or any rea-
son to kill this man. She got on very
well with him,” he added.
(From the Guardian, 24 May
1994.)
it shouldn’t be in the kitchen
it’s a poison
Learners need to identify and use
the following clues: 
- ‘by’ as signalling cause, 
- ‘the poison’ as a given entity,
which refers to ‘cyanide’, 
- ‘larder’ as a synonym for ‘kitchen
cupboard’, and
- ‘food’ as relating to ‘kitchen’.
it’s rat poison
I would like to stress the following:
• Learners should be alerted to the fact that clues may not be found in
only one place in the text, and should be trained to look for clues throughout the
text and combine them.
• The inference-steps leading to the final inference need not all be accu-
rate. Skilled readers regard those inference-steps as working hypotheses, which
can be discarded or refined in the light of new clues. In the example above the ini-
tial inference 'It is/ can be found in a kitchen
1
was later discarded.
Speaking & writing. As regards oral production, Blum-Kulka & Olshtein (in
Tarone & Yule 1989:107) suggest that learners operate along the lines of "the less
confident you are that you can get the meaning across, the more words and con-
textual information you use". Tarone & Yule (1989:113) conducted a study in
which a 'speaker' had to give instructions to a 'hearer'. The subjects were either
both native or both non-native speakers. Tarone & Yule reported that "typically
the non-native speaker group provided more detail than the native speakers
seemed to feel necessary".
Apart from providing more information than needed/expected, learners may
opt to use neutral/unmarked rather than idiomatic language, either because such
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language is beyond their linguistic ability or because they do not feel confident
enough. Finally, learners may choose to simplify their message, or communicate
part of the intended message when they are not confident that their linguistic re-
sources are adequate to express the full message.
This can prove problematic as the use by learners of more/less explicit or un-
idiomatic language, or the communication of more/less information than required
in the particular context may be perceived by listeners (particularly those for
whom English is a first language) as floutings of the maxims of Quantity and/or
Manner. In such a case, listeners may be led to work out unintended implicatures.
The issues discussed above point towards caution in the teaching of certain
communication strategies, that is strategies which help learners to compensate
for their imperfect mastery of the language when faced with a communicative
need (see Corder 1983; Ellis 1985:180-188; Tarone 1983). Communication strate-
gies are divided into achievement and reduction strategies. Achievement strate-
gies aim at the communication of the whole message as perceived by the speaker.
Relevant examples of achievement strategies are: circumlocution (e.g. 'describing'
a lexical item), paraphrasing, and lexical substitution (using related lexis). Reduc-
tion strategies aim at either communicating an imperfect or simplified message, or
communicating a message other than the one intended initially, that is, a message
that is within the speaker's linguistic abilities. By being over- or under-explicit,
and by using words/ expressions which are loosely related to the ones that accu-
rately express their intended message, learners may lead listeners/ readers to draw
unintended inferences.
Blum-Kulka & Levenston (1983) provide an example from Serbo-Croat
learners of English: "Serbo-Croat 'pametan' is used where English uses either
'sensible' or 'clever'. Serbo-Croat speakers tend to use 'clever', even when the
context demands 'sensible'. They will thus often give a connotation of 'cunning'
quite unwittingly when they use 'clever' in the wrong context."
Another case in point is the unintended implicatures communicated by mis-
or over-use of circumlocution and paraphrasing. Text (21) below is an amusing
example.
(21) The way I see it, these days there's a war on, right? And, ages ago, there
wasn't a war on, right? So, there must have been a moment when there not being a
war on went away, right? And there being a war on came along. So, what I want
to know is: how did we get from the one case of affairs to the other case of affairs?
(From the BBC video Black Adder Goes Forth, BBCV 5714, 1995),
This is said by a rather dim character in the series. The roundabout manner of
asking the simple question "How did the war start?" is intended to stress this as-
pect of the character and create a humorous effect. Unfortunately, this is also an
indication of the effect learners may create unintentionally through uncritical use
of certain communication strategies.
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When it comes to written language, teachers need to ensure that learners do
not regard explicit cohesive markers (e.g. furthermore, nevertheless) as the only or
best option they have to help readers understand the relations between parts of
their message. Learners should be made aware of the importance of information
structure and assumed shared knowledge with the readers. Overuse of explicit co-
hesive markers may be perceived by readers as flouting of the Quantity maxim,
resulting to the readers' working out unintended implicatures (e.g. be misled to be-
lieve that the writer wants to be ironic or humorous).
The following table outlines potential learner problems and proposed solutions.
A. COMPREHENSION
Problem
Learners may understand the meaning of the words/ expressions in a
text, but fail to understand the speaker’s/ writer’s intended meaning.
Solutions
Focusing not only on decoding of surface meaning, but also on interpret-
tation.
Teaching of grammar & lexis in context and through texts rather than
isolated  sentences.
Using of authentic or authentic-like texts, and avoiding exposing learn-
ers only to texts where meaning is expressed (over)explicitly.
Informing learners of relevant cultural aspects.
Guiding learners to use their knowledge, experience & beliefs con-
sciously and flexibly.
Problem
Learners get discouraged by unknown lexis and give up easily.
Solution
Training in identifying available clues & using them flexibly.
B. PRODUCTION
Problems
Learners may communicate unintended messages through being
over/under-explicit or using the wrong register, although they are grammatically
accurate.
Learners may communicate unintended messages through the use of
communication strategies.
Solutions
Avoiding asking learners to be (over)explicit at all times.
Teaching learners the use as well as the meaning of lexis. 
Training learners in understanding the amount of information the list-
ener/ reader needs or expects.
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Raising learners' awareness of the potential problems arising from the use of
communication strategies and training them to check for and clarify misunder
standings.
Table 5. Summary of teaching implications
NOTES
1. This is a revised version of my article 'Inference: Procedures & Implica-
tions for TEFL', which was published in TESOL Greece Newsletter 63 & 64
(September & December 1999). The original article was born as an essay during
my MPhil, was transformed and expanded into lecture notes for the component
'Discourse Analysis & TEFL' of the RSA/Cambridge Diploma course, (PRO-
FILE, 1994-1999), as well as my talks 'Grammar Teaching: A Discourse Perspec-
tive' (15th International Publishers' Exhibition, Athens, May 1998), 'Receptive
Skills: Discourse & Psycholinguistic Perspectives' (20th TESOL Greece Annual
Convention, March 1999), 'Inference: How it Works' (16th International Publish-
ers' Exhibition, Athens, May 1999) and 'Grammar Teaching: A new perspective'
(IATEFL Greece Event: Ways Ahead, Athens, November 1999). The revisions are
largely based on my lecture notes for the component 'Pragmatics & Discourse
Analysis for ELT' of the MA English Literature & Language, University of Indi-
anapolis Athens (September-December 2000). This version: November 2001.
2. Since the lectures and talks were task-based, both versions also draw on
the discussions with students and participants, whom I would like to thank.
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